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David Sweet
There is no moral authority like that of sacrifice.
-Nadine Gordimer'
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers surely understand sacrifice. The business of representation
requires a willingness to subjugate, at least temporarily, one's own
priorities, beliefs, and comforts to those of another. Today, that willingness
is tested and demanded with unprecedented force. Corporate litigators toil
around the clock to perfect their clients' cases. Public defenders stagger
under the heaviest caseloads their mandate and conviction will permit. In
nearly every legal market, heightened competition has tipped the balance of
power toward clients and caused practitioners to surrender more of their
autonomy and time.
Examined more closely, however, the increasingly routine actions of
attorneys are only sacrifices in a certain sense of the word-they are the
exchange of one thing for something else. Corporate lawyers are richly
compensated. The public defender's reward is in a different but no less
valuable currency. In either case, the aggregate benefits that accrue to the
lawyer roughly compensate her for her costs. This is a truism of the
rational-actor school of economics,2 and there is no reason to suppose it
does not generally prevail.
There is another brand of sacrifice, less common but equally familiar,
perfected by American litigators of the last century: the representation of a
worthy but unpopular cause or group. John Quincy Adams was an early
1. NADINE GORDIMER, THE ESSENTIAL GESTURE: WRITING, POLITICS AND PLACES 294
(Stephen Clingman ed., 1988).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 1.I-.4 (6th ed. 2003);
Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 790 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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exemplar;3 Clarence Darrow, 4 Charles Houston, 5 and others belong in the
same category. But note that each of these names is well-known to
us. Many of them were famous before their landmark efforts, but in
no case-and this seems generally true of lawyers who take similar
stands-were their careers damaged or derailed by their "sacrifice." The
notoriety of an unpopular case, successfully defended, redounds to the
defender at least in magnitude. Then, as popular opinion catches up to the
moral or legal vanguard, the pioneers are vindicated, lionized, and
ultimately rewarded.
None of this is meant to demean the actions, accomplishments, or
intentions of either everyday or exemplary lawyers. Those who do good, be
it good work or good works, should be rewarded.6 Besides, the willingness
to act on another's behalf, whatever the expected reward, requires at least a
modicum of humility. Most poignantly, the civil society in which we now
live testifies to the worthy sacrifices that lawyers as a class of professionals
have made.
But these sacrifices, although critical to our understanding of what a
lawyer is and should be, are not the type that I propose to discuss here. The
incentives to work harder for a client, or to take on a worthy cause, are well
established and well understood. Such sacrifices are rational and, above all,
they are human-the kind of sacrifice in which I am interested is arguably
not. My subject is vicarious sacrifice, the relinquishment by one person of a
right or good for the sole benefit of someone else. Within that category, I
focus on substitutionary sacrifice-the imposition of oneself in the place of
another. More specifically still, this Note examines the voluntary
assumption by one person of the cost or penalty attributable to the other.
With this last qualification, I touch on another concept generically
familiar to lawyers-atonement. In its most colloquial sense, atonement
simply means repayment, and as such, the law customarily demands
atonement for its breach-through compensatory damage awards, for
example.7 There is, however, a deeper and more technical understanding of
3. See, e.g., HOWARD JONES, MUTINY ON THE A MISTAD: THE SAGA OF A SLAVE REVOLT AND
ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN ABOLITION, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY 175-94 (rev. ed. 1988) (describing
Adams's argument of the Amistad case before the Supreme Court).
4. See, e.g., HAL HIGDON, LEOPOLD AND LOEB: THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY 188-274
(1999) (describing Darrow's defense of Leopold and Loeb).
5. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 147-205 (1976) (describing
Houston's involvement with the NAACP's legal campaign to end segregation).
6. The aphorist Mason Cooley once quipped, "Self-sacrifice usually contains an unspoken
demand for payment." The Columbia World of Quotations No. 13,630 (Robert Andrews et al.
eds., 1996), http://www.bartleby.com/66/30/13630.html. We need not be so harsh. There is an
important difference between "unspoken demands" and reasonable expectations.
7. See, e.g., In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d 297, 302 (S.D. 1997) ("Repayment alone will not
establish rehabilitation, but certainly restitution expresses the sincerest form of atonement and the
surest mark of accountability." (emphasis added)). Not all legal remedies involve this type of
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the word. Theologians and religious ethicists have defined atonement as a
complex process encompassing some or all of repentance, apology,
reparation, penance, and forgiveness. 8 The goal toward which this
progression aims is not merely the repayment of an outstanding debt, but
the complete restoration of the preexisting relationship. Accordingly,
atonement demands a willingness from the injured and the injurer to
recognize both the harm that has been caused and the sufficiency of the
remedy. It ultimately seeks to blot out the existence-and all recollection of
the existence-of the injury. 9
Several legal commentators have examined the theological doctrine of
atonement and applied it to various legal fields, most frequently and
naturally in the area of criminal justice and the study of alternative modes
of punishment.10 In each case, the version of atonement the scholar adopts
requires that the wrongdoer initiate and participate in the atonement
process. Indeed, this is the prevailing approach of the law. Justice and
economics suggest we should extract the repayment from the one who has
perpetrated the harm. "
I do not intend to challenge that approach as a general matter. It is not,
however, the model I propose to investigate here. The atonement that
interests me is the payment by one person of a debt or penalty attributable
to another. Stated more precisely, it is the vicarious and substitutional
atonement. Punitive damages and incarceration, for example, are not repayments but simply
punishments. Specific performance and other expectation-based remedies are arguably hybrids
between atonement and punishment.
8. See RICHARD SWINBURNE, RESPONSIBILITY AND ATONEMENT 81 (1989) ("Atonement
involves four components-repentance, apology, reparation, and what, for want of a better word, I
shall call penance (though not all of these are always required)."). See generally ANSELM OF
CANTERBURY, Cur Deus Homo, in THE MAJOR WORKS 284-86 (Brian Davies & G.R. Evans eds.
& Janet Fairweather et al. trans., 1998) (c. 1098) (developing the "satisfaction" theory of Christ's
atonement). Anselm's version has dominated both Catholic and Protestant theology for hundreds
of years; recently, however, there has been a resurgence in atonement theories that deemphasize
the violence implicit in satisfaction atonement in favor of pacifist, feminist, and womanist
understandings of the doctrine. See, e.g., J. DENNY WEAVER, THE NONVIOLENT ATONEMENT
(2001).
9. Cf Jeremiah 31:34 (New International Version) ("'I will forgive their wickedness and will
remember their sins no more,' [declares the Lord]."); Psalms 103:12 (New International Version)
("[A]s far as the east is from the west, so far has he removed our transgressions from us."). The
citation of Scripture here is meant to remind the reader that, although my arguments will be
secular, the origins and underlying values of atonement are inescapably religious, and particularly
strong in the Hebraic tradition. This connection-and the religious roots of secular professional
ethics generally-should be acknowledged, appreciated, and explored. See infra Section l.A.
10. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999);
cf Samuel J. Levine, Teshuva: A Look at Repentance, Forgiveness and Atonement in Jewish Law
and Philosophy and American Legal Thought, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1677 (2000) (analyzing the
relevance for contemporary American law of Jewish teachings on teshuva, or repentance); Jeffrey
C. Tuomala, Christ's Atonement as the Model for Civil Justice, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 221, 222-24
(1993) (exploring "parallels... between the four principal views of Christ's atonement and
currently debated theories of civil justice").
II. Criminal law enacts this belief most clearly. For a general discussion of an economic
approach to crime, see POSNER, supra note 2, §§ 7.1-.1 1.
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sacrifice by one person of her rights or goods to atone for the harm caused
or debt owed by another. This description is sufficiently technical; it is not
necessary for the purposes of this Note to describe fully a detailed and
dogmatic version of either sacrifice or atonement. Unlike the commentators
referred to above, I am not interested in systematically applying a specific
doctrine to a particular field of law.
Instead, this Note seeks simply to introduce to the scholarship on legal
ethics a previously foreign idea: vicarious sacrificial atonement,' 2 a
theological concept I apply here to mean the satisfaction by lawyers
personally of the penalties imposed as a result of their clients' violation of
procedural rules during the course of litigation.13 I suggest that an ethic of
vicarious sacrificial atonement is both a viable and a valuable aspirational
norm toward which legal ethics should point. Viable because the core
values served by vicarious sacrificial atonement correspond closely to those
privileged by our secular legal system. Valuable because such acts of
atonement, even if only isolated--even if only contemplated-could benefit
the legal profession in at least three plausible and practical ways: by
increasing the social and professional respect accorded to lawyers; by
restoring client counseling as the focus of the attorney-client relationship;
and by chilling client misbehavior, thereby strengthening the justice system
for all players.
Rather than venture further into already deep water, I take a step back
in Part I to examine briefly the origins and underlying values of vicarious
sacrificial atonement. In Part II, I analyze a familiar ethical dilemma to
determine the extent to which these concepts and values are currently
embodied in the codes and norms of legal ethics. Finally, in Part III, I
present in more detail some of the values, goals, and criticisms of the
aspirational model alluded to above.
A caveat at the outset is in order. A full treatment of this subject is well
beyond the scope of this Note and my ability. The concepts herein are
drawn from philosophy, psychology, civics, religion, and many other fields
(including the practice of law) in which I have no expertise. I want only to
introduce the idea of vicarious sacrificial atonement in order to start a
12. I regret that this phrase-which appears throughout the Note-is so cumbersome.
Although I may occasionally refer to the concept as simply "atonement" or by some other variant,
each of the three words conveys an important piece of the working idea, and all are necessary for
its proper expression.
13. My focus on procedural and not substantive violations is both intentional and essential to
the theories of this Note. I do not propose, for example, that a defense attorney be incarcerated for
his client's theft conviction. Instead, my concern is with procedural violations that a client
commits while being represented by counsel. The distinction is not one of seriousness, as
procedural sins such as perjury and obstruction may have severe consequences, but rather one
of context.
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conversation among scholars with credentials better suited than mine to
develop the rudimentary thoughts presented here.
I. VICARIOUS SACRIFICIAL ATONEMENT
Although the idea of vicarious sacrificial atonement is generally
familiar, its application to the professional realm is unusual and perhaps
uncomfortable. Like many religious concepts, it seems ill at ease in the
secular world; more than others, it suggests an ancient, bloody, and ignorant
history that is easily dismissed. But the religious roots of vicarious
sacrificial atonement do not invalidate its application to secular ethical
analysis. This is particularly true in the field of American legal ethics,
which emerged in the early nineteenth century out of a broader religious
revival.14 That movement sought to infuse civic duties with the sort of
religious sanctimony appropriate to a country believed to be God's new
promised land. At the same time, the newly independent nation was
growing increasingly proud of its legal system, which became a vehicle for
the ethical ambitions of religious and political reformers alike. The
professional rules that eventually emerged from this environment formed
the basis for twentieth-century codes, through which they still exercise
influence today.
We live in an era in which the Hebraic roots of legal ethics are largely
obscured, and it is inappropriate to evaluate the governing rules on religious
terms they may no longer recognize. The impact and implementation of
those rules, however, continues to be colored by the religious beliefs
(whether present or absent) of the individual practitioners on whom they
operate.' 5 Where the codes leave room for discretion, in rush whole
worldviews. This influence is not only inescapable, but also desirable, for in
many cases ethical requirements necessarily devolve to appeals to
conscience. In such cases, we hope that individual consciences have been
exposed to a breadth of influences from among which they can formulate
thoughtful and satisfying conclusions and decisions.16
14. The two acknowledged pioneers of American legal ethics were deeply religious men.
David Hoffman, who produced the first code of legal ethics in this country, was a serious Bible
scholar. Judge George Sharswood was a staunch Presbyterian whose lectures on ethics formed the
basis for the canons published by the American Bar Association in the early twentieth century.
See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT 59
(1981); THOMAS L. SHAFFER WITH MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES 196 (1991).
15. For a particularly fine example of the depth of insight a personal religious belief can bring
to questions of law and legal ethics, see JAMES A. PIKE, BEYOND THE LAW (1963).
16. Although we all may not seek, as did Karl Barth, "the theological answer to the ethical
question," KARL BARTH, ETHICS 50 (Dietrich Braun ed. & Geoffrey W. Bromley trans., 1981),
religion remains perhaps the most important ethical input for the majority of the American
population that participates regularly in organized religious services.
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The influence of religion also operates more broadly than within the
individual conscience. As William Simon writes, "[m]any private moral
perspectives, religious and not, converge with public ones. The private
perspective may inspire and motivate people to participate in the public
realm. And it may offer insights that can be translated and incorporated into
public discourse."' 7 Professor Simon expresses the hope of this Note-that
an intensely private perspective may offer applicable insights to those who
may not share its deepest ideological foundations. Those foundations, even
if not shared by the reader, are important to an understanding of the
discussion to come.
A. The Origins of Vicarious Sacrificial Atonement
The practice of sacrifice is believed to be as old as human society
itself.18 Archaeological evidence dates the convention to at least the
Paleolithic Age, and there are incidences in almost every major organized
religion. 19 Sacrifice is a deep-seated human response to the fears and
mysteries of the world and, although modern conventions have tended to
replace acts of physical sacrifice with symbolic gestures meant to
recall them, the basic dynamic continues to occupy a central position in
many faiths. The purpose of the rite varies slightly from tradition to
tradition but may generally be characterized as an attempt to enter,
maintain, or restore "a mystic beneficial relationship with the
supramundane sources of providential bounty."2° Of these goals, the
restorative, or atoning, aspect of the practice is both the most familiar and
the most important for our purposes. 2' The Old Testament, for example, is
replete with examples of propitiatory animal sacrifices made to an
offended, distant, or threatening God.22 These acts were provisional,
17. William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder to
Comments on The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 991, 1001 (1999).
18. For a comprehensive and canonical survey of the practice, see E.O. JAMES, SACRIFICE
AND SACRAMENT (1962). See also ROBERT J. DALY, CHRISTIAN SACRIFICE: THE JUDAEO-
CHRISTIAN BACKGROUND BEFORE ORIGEN (1978) (providing further depth into the study of the
Christian sacrament).
19. The rite is attenuated in some Eastern sects and has disappeared completely from Jainism,
but these traditions are somewhat more recent developments within established religions that
historically have practiced sacrifice. See JAMES, supra note 17, at 47.
20. Id. at 20.
21. One example of a nonrestorative sacrifice is Abel's offering of the fruits of his labors,
made to maintain a beneficial relationship with God. See Genesis 4:2-4 (New International
Version).
22. Examples of propitiatory sacrifices abound in other traditions as well. One such instance
is Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter Iphigenia to appease the goddess Artemis prior to his
sailing for Troy. See EURIPIDES, IPHIGENIA IN AULIS (F. Melian Stawell trans., G. Bell & Sons
Ltd. 1929).
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deontological, and backward-looking-wrongs had been committed, and
sacrifice was required to put them right.
Christianity is unique among major religions in that an act of sacrificial
atonement occupies both the sacramental and the theological center of its
belief structure. Given its historical influence on American legal ethics,
Christianity is also uniquely important to our investigation, and as such a
few extra words are warranted. Of greatest significance is Christianity's
reversal of the traditional sacerdotal roles-Christians believe that God
offered Himself as a sacrifice to restore a right relationship between a holy
God and a wayward human race. According to that belief, Christ's death
and resurrection perfected the regular animal sacrifices that God had
previously demanded of the Jews and made full atonement for the sins not
only of that people but of the entire world as well. As such, Christ's act was
one of vicarious sacrificial atonement-not provisional but permanent, not
only deontological but also teleological, not only backward-looking but also
prospective and, indeed, eternal.23
B. The Characteristics of Vicarious Sacrificial Atonement
The origins of vicarious sacrificial atonement illuminate the moral
characteristics associated with the practice.24 Although many of these
characteristics-which might be called values-are discussed more
pointedly below,25 they bear mentioning here. The characteristics may be
separated into two categories: those that are inherent in acts of vicarious
sacrificial atonement, and those that arise as a consequence of such acts.
Perhaps the most obvious item in the former category is the selflessness
displayed by the subject of the atonement-that is, the person sacrificing
herself for another.26 That subject, who must hold herself of sufficient value
to be an efficacious and meaningful sacrifice, nonetheless must account the
good of the other greater than her own good-she must love the other more
than she loves herself.27 This accounting is motivated by the second
23. These assertions are not wholly uncontroversial among theologians, but they are widely
accepted and have been applied in a similar context before. See Garvey, supra note 10, at
1805-06.
24. By "moral characteristics" I mean those that are associated with the actors themselves,
rather than systemic values like "justice" and "wholeness."
25. See infra Section M.A.
26. The distinction here between subject and object is complicated but important to my later
discussion of lawyer independence. See infra Subsection III.C.2. By positing the person being
sacrificed as the subject and not the object of the atoning act, I mean to emphasize the proactive
nature of vicarious sacrifice, which in fact requires a willingness to negate one's own subjectivity.
27. This is hardly a universal value, either in our own day or in times past. Aristotle, for one,
considered and dismissed the idea that self-sacrifice is to be preferred over self-love. See
ARISTOTLE, 9 THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 234-37 (David Ross trans., 1954) (arguing that "the
good man should be a lover of self'). The only "sacrifices" Aristotle commends are those that
redound to "the greater good" of the one making the sacrifice. Such actions are not sacrifices in
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inherent characteristic of vicarious sacrificial atonement, namely
compassion-the ability to "suffer with" the object of atonement. The one
sacrificing herself must feel compelled to do so by the hurt resulting from
the wrongs of the one for whom she makes the sacrifice. Without
compassion, her self-sacrifice will be a random act that lacks the
meaningful intentionality necessary to satisfy the wrong or debt.
Compassion is itself only made possible by the third moral characteristic
inherent in vicarious sacrificial atonement, namely the ability of the subject
to identify with the other. Identification requires that the subject and object
share at least one personal trait-their common humanity, for example-or,
to put it another way, that they each participate in a community defined at
least in part by that trait.28
There is also a set of characteristics that arise as a consequence of acts
of vicarious sacrificial atonement. The first is cohesion. The subject and
object of the sacrifice are linked and drawn together through both the
anticipation and the execution of the sacrificial act. This dynamic has
important consequences for their current and future relationship, including
the potential reduction of agency costs, an effect that is revisited briefly
later in the Note.29 The second consequential characteristic is the esteem
given to the one making the sacrifice. This is not an appropriate motive for
making vicarious sacrificial atonement, but it is a natural result that
determines the ultimate influence of the act and its actors on those who
witness or learn of the sacrifice. The third consequential characteristic of
vicarious sacrificial atonement-and it is one that flows out of the first
two-is the moral authority conferred upon the person who has made the
sacrifice. This is probably the most important trait for the purposes of this
Note, and I discuss it at greater length below.
30
II. VICARIOUS SACRIFICIAL ATONEMENT AND
PREVAILING LEGAL ETHICS
The characteristics and values of vicarious sacrificial atonement are
broadly admired in the abstract, but the sacrificial acts from which they
derive are rarely practiced in public life. When they are, as by Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. during his crusade for civil rights, their practitioners are
revered as nearly otherworldly exemplars of both public and private
the truest sense, but rather economic transactions into which any rational actor should enter given
the opportunity. Id. at 236-37. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
28. The idea of community is important to discussions of legal ethics and this Note in
particular. See infra note 109. See generally SHAFFER WITH SHAFFER, supra note 14
(investigating the relationship between lawyers and their professional and personal communities).
29. See infra note 89.
30. See infra Section III.B.
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virtue.31 Why are public acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement so rare as to
be aberrational, while similar private acts (as among members of a family)
are relatively common? There are almost certainly many reasons, but two
bear special mention. The first is that most public communities, usually
defined broadly by such shared traits as geography or race, do not present
as compelling a cause for sacrifice as, say, a threatening God or a suffering
child. The second, and more important here, is that our civic obligations are
primarily understood in terms of individual rights rather than communal
goods.32 As such, those obligations are largely defined and circumscribed
by the legal system that allocates and protects those rights, a system that
displays several traits inimical to the practice of vicarious sacrificial
atonement.
A. A Case Study-What To Do with Perjured Testimony?
Before critiquing the legal system's resistance to acts of vicarious
sacrificial atonement, we should first understand the instances in which
such acts might be appropriate and viable. I have defined vicarious
sacrificial atonement as the satisfaction by lawyers personally of the
penalties imposed as a result of their clients' violation of procedural rules
during the course of litigation. The first requirement, then, is an instance of
client misbehavior during the course of litigation. Professor Monroe
Freedman gives a familiar and all-too-frequent example. I hope that a
careful, casuistical analysis of the scenario will illuminate both the
possibilities and the values of acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement.
But first, the facts:
Assume the following situation. Your client has been falsely
accused of a robbery committed at 16th and P Streets at 11:00 p.m.
He tells you at first that at no time on the evening of the crime was
he within six blocks of that location. However, you are able to
persuade him that he must tell you the truth and that doing so will
in no way prejudice him. He then reveals to you that he was at 15th
and P Streets at 10:55 that evening, but that he was walking east,
31. In his life, death, and public ministry, Dr. King both practiced vicarious sacrificial
atonement as a means to racial reconciliation and exhorted his followers to do the same. His
speech and action evidenced both the inherent and consequential values of vicarious sacrificial
atonement: selflessness, compassion, and identification; cohesion, esteem, and moral authority.
For more on this aspect of Dr. King's theology and ministry, see JAMES WM. MCCLENDON, JR.,
BIOGRAPHY AS THEOLOGY 47-66 (new ed. 1990).
32. This is obviously an oversimplification of an impossibly complex and controversial
claim, but at the least it seems safe to say that individualistic values of liberalism take precedence
over communitarian values in several prominent understandings of our civic and legal order. See,
e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1999) ("Each person possesses an
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society cannot override.").
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away from the scene of the crime, and that, by 11:00 p.m., he was
six blocks away. At the trial, there are two prosecution witnesses.
The first mistakenly, but with some degree of persuasiveness,
identifies your client as the criminal. At that point the prosecution's
case depends upon that single witness, who might or might not be
believed. The second prosecution witness is an elderly woman who
is somewhat nervous and who wears glasses. She testifies truthfully
and accurately that she saw your client at 15th and P Streets at
10:55 p.m. She has corroborated the erroneous testimony of the
first witness and made conviction extremely likely. However, on
cross-examination her reliability is thrown into doubt through
demonstration that she is easily confused and has poor eyesight.
Thus, the corroboration has been eliminated, and doubt has been
established in the minds of the jurors as to the prosecution's
entire case.
The client then insists upon taking the stand in his own defense,
not only to deny the erroneous evidence identifying him as the
criminal, but also to deny the truthful, but highly damaging,
testimony of the corroborating witness who placed him one block
away from the intersection five minutes prior to the crime. Of
course, if he tells the truth and thus verifies the corroborating
witness, the jury will be more inclined to accept the inaccurate
testimony of the principal witness, who specifically identified him
as the criminal.33
Suppose at this point the attorney is able to secure a promise from her client
to testify truthfully. Now play out the scene: The client takes the stand (and
the oath to tell the truth), but upon direct examination reneges on his
promise and lies about his whereabouts the evening of the crime. What
should the lawyer do?
B. A Starting Point
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
serve as a starting point. Rule 3.3(a) prohibits the lawyer from "offer[ing]
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client,
or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the
lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. 34
This is hardly a ringing call to disclose the perjured testimony-the text
creeps toward the dreaded "disclosure to the tribunal," carving out room
33. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 30-31 (1975).
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002).
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for lawyerly discretion as it goes. Comment 10 to the Rule offers the
following gloss:
Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a
lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false.
Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client or another
witness called by the lawyer offers testimony the lawyer knows to
be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in
response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such
situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited
from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable
remedial measures. In such situations, the advocate's proper course
is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of
the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's
cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false
statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further
remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not
permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the
advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably
necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the
lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be protected by
Rule 1.6 [governing attorney-client privilege]. It is for the tribunal
then to determine what should be done-making a statement about
the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps
nothing.35
This is helpful, but somewhat curious. The threshold question-when
the lawyer must make disclosure-is obscured by the comment's
explication of "reasonable remedial measures," which themselves
ultimately seem to be only "such disclosure. . as is reasonably necessary
to remedy the situation." This tautology aside, the gloss does at least help to
order the attorney's steps: Most commentators agree that the remedy must
first be sought from and with the client himself.36
35. Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 10.
36. See People v. Johnson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805, 811-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("All the legal
commentators agree that when faced with a client who indicates he will commit perjury, an
attorney should first attempt to persuade the client to testify truthfully."). It is not true that "all the
legal commentators agree" about what should be done either prior to the perjury or afterwards.
The more strident segment of the defense bar disputes that knowingly presenting perjured
testimony is always wrong, and certainly disagrees that, the perjury having been committed, it
must be disclosed to the court. See Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal
Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 526-27 (1999) ("[U]nder the framework of fidelity, it would be
unethical for a defense attorney not to present a client's perjurious testimony or some other
untruth, if the client insists upon it. It would be wrong for a criminal defense lawyer... to engage
in any of the conduct often recommended for an attorney in the face of a client bent on presenting
perjured testimony: disclosure to the court, withdrawal from the case, refusal to present the
testimony, or refusal to comment on it." (emphasis added)).
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A more forceful directive is found in an ABA committee opinion
stating that "[i]t is now mandatory, under [Model Rule 3.3(a) and 3.3(b)],
for a lawyer who know[s] the client has committed perjury, to disclose this
knowledge to the tribunal if the lawyer cannot persuade the client to rectify
the perjury. 37 This approach is less ambiguous (assuming we can agree on
what "perjury" means), but it begs the question why this "mandatory"
disclosure requirement has not been written into the Code itself. It instead is
two removes from the most authoritative text, which itself requires only
"reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal. 38
One possible explanation is that the bar does not want mandatory
disclosure. This is Professor Freedman's position, which we can infer from
his analysis of the original hypothetical: "In my opinion, the attorney's
obligation in such a situation would be to advise the client that the proposed
testimony is unlawful, but to proceed in the normal fashion in presenting
the testimony and arguing the case to the jury if the client makes the
decision to go forward., 39 This view is not uncontroversial, 40 but I suspect
that Freedman has simply articulated in theory what most defense lawyers
would execute in practice.
It is important to see that a lawyer's failure to disclose her client's
perjury cannot always be attributed to a craven disregard for the truth; it
might often stem from a profound respect for it. The moment she perceives
the lie, the attorney must choose between two truths: where her client was
that night, and the trial outcome her client deserves. The first impulse may
be to label these the "smaller" and "larger" truths of the scenario,
respectively, but doing so answers prematurely the very question I would
like to explore. Calling them the "proximate" and "ultimate" truths,
4'
respectively, is more useful for these purposes.
How then to proceed? There are two approaches the attorney might
employ to choose between the respective truths: a "truth-weighing"
approach and a "truth-seeking" approach. I test these in that order now.
37. ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987), cited in Brian
Slipakoff & Roshini Thayaparan, Note, The Criminal Defense Attorney Facing Prospective Client
Perjury, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 935, 949 n.119 (2002).
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3).
39. FREEDMAN, supra note 33, at 31. For a helpful recent summary of both the shortcomings
of the Model Rules' approach and the responses of other commentators to Professor Freedman's
analysis, see Slipakoff& Thayaparan, supra note 37.
40. For one prominent critique, see Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). See also infra note 49. See generally William H. Simon,
The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993) (critiquing the assumption that the
"standard adversary ethic" is viable in criminal defense work even if too aggressive elsewhere).
41. Cf REINHOLD NEIBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 120 (1952) ("[P]olitics
deals with the proximate ends of life, and religion with ultimate ones .... ).
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C. Weighing the Truths
The first strategy is for the attorney to weigh methodically the
proximate and ultimate truths to determine which one has greater aggregate
value and thus deserves her allegiance.4 2 In doing so, she should consider
the value of the truth to the four significant entities in the scenario: the
truthful but discredited witness, the attorneys, the litigants, and the system
as a whole. I begin with the proximate truth and its value to the truthful
witness. In this scenario, the value of the proximate truth to the nearsighted
elderly woman is measurable but small-there is not a significant social
stigma to being elderly and nearsighted, and the witness has no substantial
stake in seeing her testimony verified.
In some cases, however, the discredited truth-teller will have a much
greater interest in not being thought of as a liar.43 Consider a sexual
harassment civil suit that devolves to a credibility contest between the
accused and his accuser. The charge is false (by which I mean legally
unsustainable if all truths were known by the factfinder), but the litigants
have a concealed sexual history that makes the accusation more plausible
than it might be otherwise. The plaintiff raises this history on the stand and,
against the private counsel and expectations of his attorney, the defendant
lies to rebut and discredit it. His attorney remains quiet, and the jury returns
the "right" result-a judgment in favor of the defendant. The ultimate truth
has been served, but at the cost of a proximate truth that has appreciable
value to a woman whose reputation has been unfairly tarnished.
The second group to which the disclosure of the proximate truth has
value comprises the lawyers trying the case. The defense attorney whose
client has lied has a duty to the truth as an officer of the court, and so the
disclosure of the proximate truth has a value equal to the value she places
on that duty. In addition, prompt disclosure of the proximate truth may
insulate her from the risk of future disciplinary consequences for suborning
perjury. The prosecuting attorney, on the other hand, values the proximate
truth inasmuch as he does not want to be thought of as having proffered
unreliable or false testimony, together with whatever desire he has not to be
associated with a system that permits undisclosed false testimony.
The value of disclosure of the proximate truth to the litigants in the case
is slim: The lying defendant has no stake in it, except for the value, which
42. One example of the weighing approach is William Simon's analysis of Paul Newman's
mailbox larceny in the movie The Verdict, see WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A
THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 100-01 (1998), and his subsequent defense of that analysis, see
Simon, supra note 17, at 997-98.
43. The following variation is adapted from a real-life account given by defense attorney
Kenneth Mann. See Kenneth Mann, Ethics in the Practice of Law, Lecture at Yale Law School
(Oct. 17, 2002).
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he is likely to discount, of any moral rehabilitation resulting from being
forced to confront and recant his false testimony. The prosecuting state has
scarcely more interest in the disclosure of the proximate truth, and what
value it does have is largely subsumed by its representative's personal
stake, discussed above.
So far, it seems unnecessary for the defense attorney to disclose the fact
that her client presented perjured testimony. But there is a fourth party to
which the truth may have value, and that is the system that will survive a
failure to disclose the lie. The first component of that value is theoretical,
since a failure to disclose the proximate truth puts the lie to a central
justification of the adversary system-that it is an effective truth-seeking
mechanism. One implication of a refusal to disclose the proximate truth is
that the court might not be able to reach the correct result (that is, the
ultimate truth) if that proximate truth were revealed. Accordingly, the
implication goes, the adversaries themselves must be the ones to filter or
shape the "truth" that is presented to the factfinder. The second component
of the value of the proximate truth to the system is political-the value of
the public's perception of the court as a place of not only true outcomes, but
truthfulness generally. The third and final component is the procedural
value inherent in abiding by the accepted ethical codes and rules of
procedure. This component raises larger questions of whether due process
is served whenever the right result is achieved, even if it is achieved by
procedurally or ethically dubious means.
Continuing with the weighing approach, the value of the proximate
truth summarized above must be compared to the value of the ultimate
truth-that the defendant is innocent of the crime charged. The value of this
truth is more apparent than that of the proximate truth, and only a short
summary is required here. The same four parties must be considered. The
value of the ultimate truth to the truthful witness is not appreciably greater
than the value that all laypeople share in having others' cases adjudicated
correctly. In addition to the economic rewards of success, the value of the
ultimate truth to the defense counsel is engendered through her role as the
client's agent, as one who participates in the client's interest in a correct
determination of innocence. Likewise, the prosecuting attorney, as an
officer of the court, participates in the court's interest in reaching that same
correct determination.
The value of the ultimate truth to the litigants is substantial and
obvious. The defendant has a strong interest in not being convicted for
something he did not do, including an interest in not being publicly shamed
for legal behavior, while the state has a philosophical and practical stake in
reaching the correct outcome dictated by the legality or illegality of the
behavior in question. Finally, the value to the system is similarly clear.
From a substantive perspective, the outcome is the most important thing,
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and there is political value in the public perception of the legal process as
one that consistently reaches the right result.
Reviewing the analysis, the aggregate value of the ultimate truth in this
particular hypothetical seems to outweigh significantly the aggregate value
of the proximate truth. Under the weighing approach, then, defense counsel
would be justified in withholding from the court the fact that his client
committed perjury. This methodology, I believe, is roughly the process
most practitioners would apply when faced with this scenario, and this is
almost certainly the result at which they would arrive. It is difficult to
imagine any defense lawyer jeopardizing his client's freedom (or future
business) by reporting the perjury either during or after trial. Note,
however, that the prevailing ethical rules, their interpretation by the courts,
and the majority of the academic literature all reject a non-disclosure rule;
instead, all advocate some form of post-perjury revelation.44
Regardless of what say the "scribes and teachers of the law," the
weighing approach seems in this case to be straightforward and to produce
a satisfactory result, at least within the context of the prevailing legal
system from which the hypothetical is taken. Justice has been served, even
if at the expense of truth, or more precisely, a truth. But further thought on
this result should leave us deeply unsatisfied. We should not be surprised
that the consistent subjugation of lesser truths to just results would cultivate
a professional ethic that increasingly undervalues those truths. Such is the
case in our current system. Witness perjury, suborned or spontaneous, is
endemic-so frequent in criminal cases that parties on both sides expect
that witnesses will lie to the extent they cannot be debunked by the
opposition.45 This suspicion has worked its way into our conception of a no-
holds-barred adversary system, but it is surely against both the original
44. There are notable exceptions to this position, of course, including Professor Freedman's.
See supra notes 33, 39 and accompanying text; see also Smith & Montross, supra note 36, at
526-27.
45. There is a general feeling that the rate of witness perjury is ever-increasing:
[J]udges and others insist that the anecdotal evidence of a growing frequency of perjury
is overwhelming.
"It is much more serious a problem than most people believe," says V. Robert
Payant, president of the National Judicial College in Reno, Nev. "For the last couple of
years, we have been hearing this complaint from more and more of our judges. It's no
longer a small twisting of the facts or a little white lie here or there. It's happening in
almost every case."
Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It: Judges Maintain That Perjury Is on the Rise, but the Court
System May Not Have Enough Resources To Stem the Tide, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 68, 69,
quoted in Manuel R. Ramos, Legal and Law School Malpractice: Confessions of a Lawyer's
Lawyer andLaw Professor, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 890 n.77 (1996). Notwithstanding the anecdotal
suspicions of judges, there is no particular reason to believe that standards of truthfulness have
decreased significantly over time. In any case, pervasive witness perjury has been of academic
concern for nearly a century. See W.A. Purrington, The Frequency of Perjury, 8 COLUM. L. REV.
67 (1908); Alfred David Whitman, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury in Our Courts,
59 DICK. L. REV. 127, 127 (1955) ("Few crimes except fornication are more prevalent or carried
offwith greater impunity.").
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design and any rational version of that system.46 Why swear witnesses to
the truth if not to expect it, and why persist in the practice if the oath has
become a mockery? Given the erosion of truthfulness in our courts, 47 it is
worth at least investigating an approach to the hypothetical that pays more
respect to all truths.
D. Seeking the Truths
A truth-seeking approach would try to satisfy the desire for truth to the
greatest extent possible. The goal is to reach both truths of the client-
perjury hypothetical-that the client is innocent, and that at the time of the
crime he was not in fact where he claimed to be in his testimony. Note that
this approach does not privilege one truth over another ex ante; therefore, it
may yet please adversarial defense lawyers who have their clients' best
interests in mind.
As an initial matter, because the defendant in this case is in fact
innocent, his counsel should not interrupt the proceedings to challenge the
proffered testimony or bring it to the attention of the court if doing
so would jeopardize the correct outcome.48 Instead, disclosure of the
perjury-thereby reaching the proximate truth-should happen after the
verdict has been reached. How should such disclosure be effected? There
seem to be two basic alternatives: The first is for the lawyer to do so in such
a way that places responsibility for the perjury on the client; the second is
for the lawyer to accept that responsibility himself. The former approach is
advocated by the Model Rules, a majority of the academic literature, and
the many courts that have considered the issue.49 It intuitively appeals to
46. But as some are quick to point out, the impulse toward perjury may be inherent in and
encouraged by the adversarial nature of the system. Geoffrey Hazard is reported to have said:
"Why do we expect people to be absolutely honest when their entire economic life or their
freedom and liberty relies on it? ... Yes, shading the truth and telling lies occurs in almost every
case, I am sure. But we have created this adversarial system that encourages it." Curriden, supra
note 45, at 69. For further discussion of the tension between the adversary system and vicarious
sacrificial atonement, see infra Subsection III.C. 1.
47. Or simply the lack thereof-its rate of change is irrelevant here.
48. This initial decision is necessary to serve the ultimate truth, but it is vulnerable to several
lines of criticism, including one focusing on questions of role fidelity and institutional
competence. I attempt to respond to this critique below. See infra Subsection III.C.3.
49. For the treatment of the issue in the Model Rules, see supra notes 34-38 and
accompanying text. Most (and perhaps all) state and federal courts have ruled on the issue. The
U.S. Supreme Court, while denying its ability to. promulgate ethical rules governing state court
practice, has implicitly sided with lawyers by holding that a counsel's threat to withdraw from a
case in the event of her client's perjury cannot give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). Nix is the leading case on an attorney's
responsibilities in the face of client perjury, and it yields several observations that are relevant
here. The first is the way in which the legal question was framed, not as "What should a lawyer do
in the face of client perjury?" but rather as "Is it a violation of a client's constitutional rights for
his lawyer to do this particular thing in the face of client perjury?" As a result, the Nix opinion is
less a normative exploration of legal ethics than an attempt to define the boundaries of a
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our symmetrical sense of fairness-the client lied, the client should accept
responsibility. As then-Judge Cardozo once aphorized, "The willful
transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression.,
50
But symmetry has its costs. The drafters of the notes to the Model
Rules recognize the serious consequences that even post-trial disclosures of
client perjury may have:
The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave
consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal
but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But
the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court,
thereby subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary
system is designed to implement. Furthermore, unless it is clearly
understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the
existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's
advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep
silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a
party to fraud on the court.51
What is needed is a disclosure that mitigates any sense of betrayal,
protects the correct substantive outcome (the ultimate truth), and precludes
nonethical legal issue, namely, the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1985). See Nix, 475 U.S. at 172 ("We see this as a case in
which the attorney successfully dissuaded the client from committing the crime of perjury.").
The four Justices concurring in the judgment (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens-
all of whom had tended to favor expansion of defendants' rights) were not satisfied that the Court
had limited its opinion to this latter, proper purpose, and wrote to clarify that "the Court's essay
regarding what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client's suggestion that he will
perjure himself is pure discourse without force of law." Id. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring). They
also wrote to preserve and protect a more flexible ethical regime in which "[t]he complex
interaction of factors, which is likely to vary from case to case, makes inappropriate a blanket rule
that defense attorneys must reveal, or threaten to reveal, a client's anticipated perjury to the
court." Id. at 189 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This statement affirms the sort of "truth-weighing"
methodology that I believe most practicing lawyers support and employ. See supra Section II.C.
The Court's analysis and holding, limited to the Strickland context, is likewise consistent
with prevailing legal doctrine and is undoubtedly correct as a matter of law. Behavior in line with
the stated ethical norms-regardless of the consistency with which those norms should be or
actually are followed-hardly can give rise to a Strickland violation. But Nix reflects the
prevailing legal and ethical regime in yet another way. The result in Nix underscores the reality
that attorney withdrawal, as much as attorney reporting, puts responsibility for the perjury
squarely on the client. This truth has attracted little or no notice in the voluminous academic
literature that has responded to Nix and addressed the issue more generally. See Slipakoff &
Thayaparan, supra note 37, at 937 n.15 (listing prominent articles). None of this literature-nor
any ethical writing about the perjury hypothetical-suggests that the lawyer might assume any
part of the blame for the client. Thomas Shaffer, who conducts an extensive analysis of the client-
perjury scenario, somewhat surprisingly sides with Professor Freedman, concluding that the lie
should not be revealed. Professor Shaffer's reasoning, to the extent that it focuses exclusively on
the client at the expense of those hurt by the perjury, is arguably inconsistent with his community-
esteeming approach elsewhere. See SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 93-104.
50. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (2002) (citation omitted).
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a prosecution for perjury. I assert that an act of vicarious sacrificial
atonement-the assumption by the lawyer of the responsibility for her
client's perjury-can accomplish all three, with the important caveat that
each of these consequences of the act is ultimately beyond the attorney's
control.52
E. Serving the Truth Through Vicarious Sacrificial Atonement
Suppose, subsequent to a verdict of not guilty for her client, the
victorious attorney were to disclose her client's perjury to the court and
fully accept all responsibility for the violation, including expressing a
willingness to bear whatever sanctions, censure, or other consequences
would usually be attributable to the client.53 What would this accomplish?
The first result, and one that is independent of the court's response, is to
achieve the truth-seeking goal discussed earlier. The ultimate truth has been
reached by the jury or judge; now the proximate truth has come out as well.
Whatever the magnitude of the value we ascribe to that proximate truth, we
surely believe that its disclosure, independent of consequences, is to be
preferred over its concealment. We hope that such disclosure will reinforce
the ethic of truthfulness on which we believe an ideal system of justice
must be based; the interpretation and application of that ethic in this
particular case is in the hands of the presiding judge. I examine this aspect
of the scenario shortly.
A related result, also independent of the court's response, is the
affirmation of the attorney's role as an "officer of the court." Although that
title has been criticized as vague and misleading, 54 and has been invoked in
support of many different conceptions of the lawyerly role, 55 I do not rely
on any overly technical definition. Instead, I read the phrase as something
akin to "officer of the truth," on the theory that the court is imagined,
positioned, and expected to be the primary truth-seeker. 6 In fact, a lawyer's
52. For a brief discussion of the court's possible reaction to such an act, see infra note 60 and
accompanying text. For a more general discussion both of the barriers to acts of vicarious
sacrificial atonement and of the proper response of an ethical actor in the face of such barriers, see
infra Section III.C.
53. It is important for the aspirations of the ethical model that the attorney not herself lie; that
is, she must make clear that although she did not suborn perjury and even counseled against it, she
nonetheless is willing to accept responsibility for the act.
54. See, e.g., James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer
of the Court," 48 BuFF. L. REv. 349, 353 (2000); Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers ofthe
Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39, 39 (1989).
55. See Cohen, supra note 54, at 353.
56. Cf Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986) ("[T]he responsibility of an ethical
lawyer, as an officer of the court and a key component of a system ofjustice, dedicated to a search
for truth, is essentially the same whether the client announces an intention to bribe or threaten
witnesses or jurors or to commit or procure perjury. No system of justice worthy of the name can
tolerate a lesser standard.").
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fealty to the truth-and particularly here the proximate truth-applies a
degree of moral and ethical pressure to the presiding judge, who herself
may be reminded of her own duties in the service of both the proximate and
the ultimate truth. In any case, by disclosing a truth that would otherwise
remain concealed, the lawyer has discharged a portion of her duty toward
the proper functioning of the adjudicatory process.
Before turning to the possible responses of the court to the attorney's
act, a few words are called for regarding the act's effect on the attorney's
relationship with her client.57 The commentators to the Model Rules are
right to be concerned about betrayal-trust is the foundation of our greatest
hopes for the ethical potential of the attorney-client relationship, and this
potential is in turn one of the strongest arguments against simply reporting
the client's perjury and assigning him the blame.
An ideal act of vicarious sacrificial atonement has two characteristics
that should dampen the client's feelings of betrayal. The first is its
congruence with the rest of the attorney-client relationship. The client must
be able to locate and understand his counsel's sacrifice within the context of
their prior and anticipated future dealings. Recall our earlier discussion of
the inherent characteristics of vicarious sacrificial atonement. Necessary to
the client's understanding is an appreciation of the lawyer's compassion for
and identification with her client, values that should pervade the entire
representation and not merely this single act. Accordingly, the sacrifice
should follow pretrial counseling against perjury, which all commentators
recommend, and a warning that the lawyer is prepared to make the sacrifice
should her client persist in the lie. If this attention fails to prevent the
perjury, the client can hardly then feel betrayed when the lawyer makes
good on her "threat."
The second characteristic is self-evident-the act is, or is intended to
be, atoning. If accepted by the court, the lawyer's sacrifice is fully
substitutionary and removes the legal guilt and liability otherwise
attributable to the client.58 This may trigger a range of responses by the
beneficiary of such an act, but a feeling of betrayal-antithetical to the
value of cohesion discussed earlier-should not be one of them.
Of course, the client's paramount objective in this case is not precisely
the continued concealment of the proximate truth, but rather that disclosure
of that truth not expose him to any liability. 59 Much turns, then, on the
57. See infra Section III.B (discussing these issues within the context of a broader
aspirational norm of vicarious sacrificial atonement).
58. The lawyer's sacrifice does publicly expose the defendant as a liar and thus subjects him
to extralegal shame and sanction. The fullest expression of vicarious sacrificial atonement would
include efforts by the lawyer to mitigate even this consequence, perhaps by requesting that the
details of the client's infraction remain confidential.
59. Note that once the defendant has been acquitted of the original, substantive charge, the
constitutional double jeopardy prohibition protects him from being retried on that charge, even if
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response of the court to the lawyer's act of vicarious sacrificial atonement.
To the extent that this is an ethical matter for the presiding judge, outside of
the control of the lawyer, speculation and suggestions regarding the likely
or preferred response are largely outside the bounds of this Note.60 I do
believe, however, that there are two powerful signals that the atoning
lawyer communicates to the bench to encourage a just and truthful
resolution. The first I have mentioned already: By "speaking truth to
power" in a costly and unexpected way, and particularly by disclosing a
proximate truth typically undervalued by her profession, the lawyer
emphasizes to the judge the importance of the truth and the court's service
of it. The second signal is more mundane but no less important. The
lawyer's willingness both to disclose the perjury and to accept its penalty
strongly suggests that her client is innocent-that is, that the factfinder has
already reached the ultimate truth. The counsel for a guilty client found
innocent is unlikely to stay in the courtroom any longer than she needs to.
subsequent to the acquittal defense counsel discloses his client's perjury. See U.S. CONST. amend.
V ("No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .... ); Nix, 475 U.S. at 186 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Furthermore, under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, if the eventually disclosed perjury directly relates to one of the required
elements of the offense, the factfinder's determination that that element has not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt operates to bar prosecution not only for the original substantive charge
but the disclosed perjury as well. In effect, the jury's determination dictates not only the ultimate
truth but also all subordinate proximate truths. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)
("'Collateral estoppel' . . . stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of
justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid
and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit."); United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying the collateral
estoppel doctrine to bar a subsequent perury prosecution). But see United States v. Ruhbayan,
325 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the doctrine did not bar a subsequent perjury
prosecution when the original trial jury had effectively ignored the defendant's perjured
testimony).
60. That said, my hypothetical is not meaningfully coherent without a few words about the
options available to the court in such a situation. Given the defendant's likely immunity from
retrial, those options must address the perjury itself: A court may initiate proceedings against the
lawyer for his involvement in the perjury or, with the consent of the state, a perjury prosecution of
the defendant himself. In the scenario I have presented here, the disclosing defense counsel would
offer to assume the penalty that would be imposed on his client were his client found guilty of
perjury. For example, the federal perjury statute provides that convicted pejurers shall be "fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
This particular arrangement has one significant benefit-the attorney does not need to claim
he has "suborned" perjury, which he has not-and one significant drawback, namely that the
judge needs to accept the attorney's vicarious sacrifice and, accordingly, the transfer of
punishment from client to counsel. To my knowledge, there is no record of a court faced with this
scenario, and it remains an open question whether the law would actually allow this. But courts
are given broad leeway in punishing attorney misconduct-reprimands, fines, suspensions, prison
terms-and it is not difficult to imagine some sort of ad hoc resolution. If nothing else, the
attorney has violated the Model Rules by not taking "reasonable remedial measures" during trial,
thus giving the judge a basis for which to impose on the attorney a punishment equivalent to that
attributable to the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002). Such a
solution would not be ideologically or schematically "clean," but it would accomplish most of the
purposes and serve most of the values of a true substitutionary sacrifice.
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III. VICARIOUS SACRIFICIAL ATONEMENT
AND ASPIRATIONAL LEGAL ETHICS
This lengthy treatment of a commonplace ethical dilemma is meant to
introduce some of the goals, characteristics, and risks of an individual act of
vicarious sacrificial atonement. Surely my recommendation seems
hopelessly naive, but I do hope that it shines a slightly brighter light on
some imperfections in the ethical framework within which such dilemmas
arise. In any case, although the client perjury example provides perhaps the
most frequent opportunity for a lawyer to make vicarious atonement for his
client's misbehavior, my purpose in this Note is to sketch the contours of an
aspirational ethical norm, not to detail an aspirational solution to one
particular ethical dilemma.6'
Perhaps not surprisingly, the aspirational ethical norm I propose is, like
my "solution" to the client perjury dilemma, hopelessly naive. And I trust
there is value in that. Holding up a proposal, however optimistic, as a goal
toward which the existing system should strive and evolve serves an
important purpose in structuring and channeling discussion regarding the
relevant issue. Without such prodding,
[d]iscussions of legal ethics have a tendency to collapse into
discussions of lawyer regulation. This happens when people
assume that an ethical criticism of lawyering could be plausible
only if it were susceptible to formulation and enforcement as a
disciplinary rule.
This tendency should be resisted.... [I]t runs against the
central current of the aspirational tradition of professional rhetoric.
The term "ethics" has been applied to our subject precisely to
suggest that it involves more than coercive rule enforcement. It is in
part a collective effort to define the meaning of good lawyering and
to mark out the road to personal satisfaction and social respect as a
lawyer.
62
Thus fortified, I attempt in the remainder of this Note to flesh out the
aspirational norm that encourages and supports individual acts of vicarious
sacrificial atonement such as the one examined in the client perjury
scenario above.
61. Unfortunately, opportunities abound for vicarious sacrificial atonement for client
misdeeds. This is particularly true in criminal cases, although there are analogues in civil
proceedings (particularly concerning discovery abuse) and even in less formal settings, such as
when counsel for a recalcitrant client makes up a difference in settlement demands out of his own
pocket. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 41 (1994).
62. SIMON, supra note 42, at 195.
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I hope that by this point in the argument it is clear what I mean when I
say "an act of vicarious sacrificial atonement." The act itself might take
many forms, but all would share the general characteristics described earlier
and exemplified in my proposed solution to the client perjury hypothetical.
My claim now is that these acts are only viable within the context of a
broader aspirational norm that infiltrates and influences all aspects of the
attorney-client relationship. That norm is best described by the values it
hopes to serve, the goals at which it aims, and the barriers to its realization.
A. The Values of Vicarious Sacrificial Atonement
The groundwork for this discussion was laid in my earlier discussion of
the inherent characteristics of vicarious sacrificial atonement: selflessness,
compassion, and identification. These characteristics, together with the
fundamental purpose and effect of the act itself, suggest two sets of values
that acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement serve.63 The first set comprises
abstract values: justice, truthfulness, and mercy, or what we might call
"care." 64 The values in the second set are more concrete: client victory,
client autonomy, client rectitude, and client goodness.65
The core purpose and effect of vicarious sacrificial atonement-to put
right a wrong-implicates the values of justice and truthfulness. These
values are related but, as we saw in the client perjury hypothetical, not
always coterminous. (That analytical exercise attempted to identify and
eliminate the tension between the two by interposing a response that
satisfied both.) One difference between the two values is the entity most
closely associated with each. Justice is customarily seen as the
responsibility of the state and its agents, while truthfulness is generally
conceived of as a personal virtue.66 By positing both as values served by
acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement, I wish to suggest that such acts
bridge an important ethical divide between the moral obligations of the
state and its agents and those of the individual acting as an independent
moral unit. The performer of an act of vicarious sacrificial atonement is
foremost an individual, not an officer of the court or even the member of a
63. Each set has been appropriated from Thomas Shaffer and Robert Cochran's insightful
Lawyers, Clients, and Moral Responsibility, although they neither characterize nor apply the
values in the way that I do here. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 61.
64. For useful background on the nature and operation of these three values in the context of
the attorney-client relationship, see id. at 62-92.
65. Id. at 3. The authors suggest that all analysis of attorney-client "moral issues" turns on the
question of what the attorney wants for his client and list these four values as possible answers to
that question.
66. 1 agree with Aristotle, Aquinas, and the many others who insist that justice is also an
important personal virtue. I claim here only that justice is not the dominant concept in the
dialogue or dynamic of interpersonal relationships. When someone "does right" by another
person, she does a work ofjustice, but she is not likely to think of it in those terms.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 1 13: 219
Sacrifice, Atonement, and Legal Ethics
profession, although her act has consequences for both. The hallmark of
this individuality is mercy, a value that transcends and even opposes the
system in which the act takes place.
Mercy is also the third abstract value served by vicarious sacrificial
atonement. Unlike justice and truthfulness, mercy is more closely related to
the inherent characteristics of the act-selflessness, compassion, and
identification-than to the core purpose and effect of atonement.
Discussion of the role of mercy in criminal law, and particularly in
sentencing, appears occasionally in the legal literature,67 but mercy's
proponents and detractors disagree vigorously about both its moral and
practical implications, and the idea has gained little traction in popular
circles. I skirt this debate by framing mercy differently, as applying to the
relationship between attorney and client rather than between criminal and
state or victim. This mercy is best understood, as Thomas Shaffer and
Robert Cochran appreciate, as an "ethic of care., 68 In their understanding,
"Isolation, oppression, pain, and suffering are seen as basic evils."
69
Applying that principle here, clients whose bad acts require atonement are
truly in need of care, and, to be caring, the lawyer's response must be
selfless, compassionate, and empathetic.
These values are admirable, but are also so universal as to risk. being
useless in resolving an actual ethical dilemma. They are important to
mention insofar as they describe acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement as
extensions of personal morality into the professional and civic spheres; to
be viable in the prevailing ethical environment, however, those acts need to
operate on terms that lawyers and clients can evaluate and apply.
Fortunately, both these abstract principles and the inherent characteristics
of vicarious sacrificial atonement serve a set of more concrete, client-
oriented values.
The first, client victory, may not always be at issue, as when the client
has committed a procedural infraction (such as missing a scheduled court
hearing) for which his attorney makes atonement, but the justice-seeking
nature of vicarious sacrificial atonement assures that that any meritorious
substantive claim will be advocated and served. The client perjury
hypothetical demonstrated that vicarious sacrificial atonement need not call
for the sacrifice of client victory to some abstract notion of truth, although it
may often require risking loss to reach both victory and a fuller satisfaction
of the requirements of truthfulness.
67. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in Capital
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1996); Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal
Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 288 (1993).
68. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 61, at 71.
69. Id. (quoting OWEN FLANIGAN, VARIETIES OF MORAL PERSONALITY 203 (1991)).
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Client autonomy is the second concrete value, and is protected by the
ex post facto nature of acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement. Although we
hope that both ethical counseling and the lawyer's "threat" of vicarious
sacrificial atonement will prevent misbehavior, the client should be
permitted in the end to exercise his autonomous ability to misbehave. The
lawyer should not interfere, for even anticipated misbehavior provides an
opportunity for both lawyer and client to learn a beneficial moral lesson.70
Furthermore, the client remains free not to accept the lawyer's act of
vicarious sacrificial atonement. Unlike the strong-arm tactics of
paternalism, such acts are made from a position of weakness-they have no
force apart from the willingness of both client and court to accept their
efficacy and sufficiency.
If accepted, however, vicarious sacrificial atonement powerfully serves
the third concrete value-client rectitude. A successful act of vicarious
sacrificial atonement removes all traces of wrongdoing and restores the
client to the position he occupied prior to his misdeed.71 It should not leave
him unchanged, however, as the attorney-client relationship has been
radically altered. No longer is the lawyer merely a collaborator, a joint
venturer, a counselor, or even a friend. She has rendered herself a sacrifice,
and is accordingly endowed with greater moral authority than her strictly
professional role confers upon her.
Finally, should the attorney-client relationship continue subsequent to
the act of vicarious sacrificial atonement, we should expect that the act,
through the attorney who performed it, will serve the value of client
goodness by encouraging in the client superior moral behavior to that which
he practiced previously. I examine this potential benefit-a goal of the
aspirational norm-more fully below,72 but only after a discussion of the
two more fundamental goals that enable it.
B. The Goals of Vicarious Sacrificial Atonement
The primary purpose of an act of vicarious sacrificial atonement is, of
course, to propitiate for a wrong or to repay a debt, thus eliminating both
the need for further satisfaction and all memory of the transgression. These
individual acts derive from, are supported by, and further propagate an
aspirational norm of vicarious sacrificial atonement that has its own agenda
for attorney-client relations. I asserted at the outset that acts of vicarious
sacrificial atonement could benefit the legal profession in at least three
70. But see supra note 58.
71. This is something that the traditional ethics of client counseling seems not to appreciate.
For a discussion of an approach to counseling that more fully considers what should happen after
the client has committed the bad act, see infra Subsection l1I.B.2.
72. See infra Subsection 1II.B.3.
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plausible and practical ways: by increasing the social and professional
respect accorded to lawyers; by restoring client counseling as the focus of
the attorney-client relationship; and by chilling client misbehavior, thereby
strengthening the justice system for all players. I examine these goals in
more detail now.
1. Increasing Respect for Lawyers
Unlike the other two goals of vicarious sacrificial atonement, increasing
the level of social and professional respect accorded to lawyers is not
directly related to the interests of the client. Still, it is not entirely
self-centered. Although heightened respect would work wonders for the
psychological and spiritual well-being of lawyers-an important concern of
legal ethics-respect is also critically important to the quality of the
attorney-client relationship. This is true both in the broadest view, as clients
are drawn from the world of people with attitudes about lawyers, and within
the narrow confines of a single representation, whether construed as an
agency relationship (where respect reduces costs) or a more organic
counseling relationship (where respect increases efficacy). I suggest that the
establishment of an aspirational norm of vicarious sacrificial atonement,
propagated and punctuated by individual acts of the same, would increase
the esteem given to all lawyers. This newfound respect would improve
not only the quality of lawyers' lives, but also the moral quality of the
attorney-client relationship and its fruits-litigation, business dealings, and
the many other tasks lawyers undertake for their clients.
It is both trite and untrue to say that lawyers get no respect. Although
public sentiment varies widely-perhaps more widely than with regard to
any other profession-it is on the whole more positive than the proliferation
of lawyer jokes and media caricatures would suggest. Nonetheless, lawyers
as a class labor under at least a weak presumption that their intelligence,
effort, and training are employed not in the service of the law but in
manipulation or evasion of it. This suspicion may be a self-fulfilling
prophecy, as lawyers "live down" to the expectations of the society whose
collective attitude necessarily colors how attorneys perceive themselves.
But there are stronger influences on attorney behavior than simply public
perception. The adversary system in which lawyers operate makes unique
moral and ethical demands on its practitioners. In turn, the ways in which
lawyers meet those demands influence the degree of respect accorded to
them as individuals and as a professional class.
I suspect that most lawyers accept some version of David Luban's
theory of role morality as a necessary and proper component of a
functioning adversary system. Professor Luban contends (and I am
simplifying here) that a person's moral obligations are defined, and her
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ethical decisions justified, in reference to the professional context that
precipitates the obligation or decision: Broadly put, "[tihe social script tells
us the role we are to perform, and our range of choices lies primarily in the
manner in which we perform our role."' 3 As it applies to, say, criminal
defense lawyers, the theory holds that "adversarial advocacy... [is]
justified by powerful moral and political concerns in the criminal defense
paradigm." 74 Role morality thus enables what William Simon calls the
"Dominant View" of American legal process 75-that "[t]he duty of a
lawyer, both to [the] client and to the legal system, is to represent [the]
client zealously within the bounds of the law."76 Certain personal qualities,
attitudes, and responses that would be disparaged by common morality are
valorized when employed in service of the client's aims. Although many
commentators are suspicious of the implications of role morality and its
contribution to the Dominant View,7 the very dominance of that view
suggests that most practitioners have deeply internalized the adversarial
ethic and its channeled morality.
One difficulty with role morality as applied in the Dominant View is
that it makes for bad press. Its conclusions, even when internally consistent,
often seem to the outsider immoral and unjustified. This should not surprise
us. As Professor Simon writes, "The popular view that defense lawyers
commonly get acquittals for guilty defendants is probably wrong, but it is a
reasonable inference to draw from arguments that portray aggressive
defense as a potent bulwark against the state.",78 The problem is one of
perspective. There are three reasons a layperson might see the departures of
role morality as ethical underachievement rather than actions justified by
role. First, lawyers are highly trained-ignorance is no defense. Second,
lawyers occupy positions of considerable responsibility-immateriality is
no defense. Third, lawyers operate explicitly in a field concerned with the
regulation of human behavior-irrelevance is no defense.
There are valid objections to each of these arguments against role
morality, but I will not address them here. Instead, I argue in the opposite
direction, that the lawyer's role-incorporating her training, responsibility,
and societal purpose-confers on her the potential for extraordinary moral
impact and the obligation to use that potential to work moral good for both
73. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 106 (1988).
74. Id. at 148.
75. SIMON, supra note 42, at 7.
76. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1980). Professor Simon translates this
official formulation as follows: "[T]he lawyer must--or at least may-pursue any goal of the
client through any arguably legal course of action and assert any non-frivolous legal claim."
SIMON, supra note 42, at 7.
77. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 42, at 170-94 (arguing that role morality does not justify
certain adversarial litigation strategies practiced by criminal defense attorneys and espoused by
the Dominant View).
78. Id. at 193.
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her client and her community. As the earlier analysis of the client perjury
hypothetical suggests, vicarious sacrificial atonement can accomplish both
goals.
My argument for more rigorous moral obligations for lawyers owes
much to Justice Louis Brandeis's belief in the "opportunity in the law," that
"lawyers have the opportunity to make the law better by law reform
activity, and to make their clients better by using their advisory role to
awaken the client to the public dimension of their activities, to steer them in
the direction of the public good., 79 Justice Brandeis's view, however,
esteems foremost the public interest and requires that lawyers first serve a
common good. The norm of vicarious sacrificial atonement, on the other
hand, is at heart a personal ethic that seeks to reach a broader audience from
below rather than from above. Unlike what Professor Luban calls the
"social-engineering mentality, 80 of Justice Brandeis's thinking, vicarious
sacrificial atonement esteems individual clients in the hopes that the
synergistic effects of isolated acts of sacrifice will resound through the
community to the ultimate benefit of all. The norm is based on a
willingness to serve, not preside.
81
Although the individual client is undoubtedly the focus of an act of
vicarious sacrificial atonement, the ethical norm associated with such acts
has important benefits for his lawyer's well-being and social status. One
danger of the role morality expressed in the prevailing adversary system is
its tendency to creep into the personal morality of individual lawyers. John
Rawls describes this process as the acquisition of a "definite pattern of
wants and aspirations" unique to a chosen profession. 82 So an athlete might
become aggressive and competitive off the playing field, a brain surgeon
obsessive and wary outside the hospital. There is a certain chicken-and-egg
dynamic at work here, but what is clear, and more to the point, is that
at least a trace of whatever popular distaste attaches to lawyers as
professionals follows them out of the office as well.
This phenomenon qualifies Montaigne's contention that "a man of
honour is not accountable for the crimes or stupidities of his profession." 83
79. LUBAN, supra note 73, at 171; see also LOUiS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law,
in BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY 52 (Philippa Sturm ed., 1995).
80. LUBAN, supra note 73, at 172.
81. Cf Mark 10:45 (New International Version) ("[T]he Son of Man did not come to be
served, but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many.").
82. RAWLS, supra note 32, at 365; see also SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 61, at 49-50
(suggesting that a lawyer's adversarial role can influence him personally and make him
"insensitive to moral issues"); Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 77 (1980) ("To preserve his integrity, a lawyer must carefully distance himself
from his activities.").
83. MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, On Restraining Your Will, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS 1134,
1144 (M.A. Screech ed. & trans., 1993). But see GERALD J. POSTEMA, Self-Image, Integrity, and
Professional Responsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS
286, 291 (David Luban ed., 1983) ("The responsible person seeks to integrate roles, relations,
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Even if the honest lawyer-that is, one who is honest both away from and
at her desk-is not morally culpable for the downward moral departures
demanded by her adversarial role, she is responsible for those "vices" to the
extent that her effectiveness as an advocate and her personal satisfaction are
diminished by popular association of her own morality with the morality of
her profession. By enacting and promoting a higher moral standard-one
characterized by selflessness, compassion, and identification-acts of
vicarious sacrificial atonement can operate within the adversary system to
mitigate such adverse consequences.
2. Restoring Client Counseling
Just as the goal of increasing respect for attorneys operates in the
shadow of the adversary system, the goal of restoring client counseling as
the focus of the attorney-client relationship must be explored in relation
to its primary stumbling block: a prevailing ethic of professional
independence that limits the exposure lawyers have to the consequences of
their clients' moral choices.
84
One drawback of the ethic of professional independence is a limited
conception of the scope and potential of client counseling. Most legal
writing on client counseling is prospective-it focuses on ethical exchanges
that take place between lawyer and client before the misdeed occurs. We
saw a common instance of this in Professor Freedman's client perjury
hypothetical: The client makes known to the lawyer his intention to commit
an unethical act; the lawyer "advises" (the word used by both Freedman and
the Model Rules) her client of the various prevailing legal and ethical duties
that apply to one or another of them; the client listens to the advice,
understands it, and proceeds to commit the unethical act anyway.
From any rational perspective, the client's commission of the unethical
act must be seen as a failure of the counseling relationship, and the more
strongly we assert the existence of such a relationship, the more apparent
the failure becomes. This may explain the fullness and vigor with which
prevailing ethical models excuse the individual lawyer from any fault. To
do so requires a strong reliance on a choice-based theory of rights. The
client has the autonomy to choose for good or for ill, and all his lawyer (and
the legal ethicist) can do in the event of a wrong choice is throw up her
hands. Clients will be clients, after all.
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Thomas Shaffer has written that choice-based ethics "has shown less
interest than we might expect in how quandaries come about."86 As
Professor Shaffer notes, moral dilemmas are currently seen as a problem for
the lawyer to navigate rather than an opportunity for discourse with the
client. 87 I would add that choice-based ethical models, along with the
approach to client counseling they imply, also have shown insufficient
interest in what happens after the quandary or dilemma has been resolved
incorrectly-that is, after the client has misbehaved.
Vicarious sacrificial atonement is intimately concerned with what
happens after the bad act has been committed, and this concern is the key to
a true and efficacious counseling relationship. I have already alluded to
several aspects of the connection between acts of vicarious sacrificial
atonement and the goal of client counseling, one of which is the importance
to effective counseling of the moral authority with which the performer of
the act is endowed. That authority derives in significant part from the
professional and social esteem the client accords the lawyer, a phenomenon
that reinforces the importance of increasing that esteem. Moral authority
also emerges from the characteristics of identification, dominant before the
act of atonement, and cohesion, dominant after the act, to bind the
counselor to the client and increase the authenticity and power of her
counsel.
Within an aspirational norm of vicarious sacrificial atonement,
whatever moral authority the lawyer has with the client is employed toward
the practice of mercy-what I am calling "care"--as the key value served
by the counseling relationship. 88 This value is both prospective and
retrospective. Prior to the bad act, it seeks to intervene to spare the client
the moral damage his misbehavior will wreak. Following the misdeed, it
seeks to atone for that damage and to make whole both the client and the
injured party.
Such an encompassing relationship survives even the client's rejection
of his lawyer's counsel against the bad act. Through the anticipation and
execution of acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement, the attorney-client
relationship develops into something beyond a collaboration, beyond a joint
venture, beyond even a friendship. It is in effect transformed from a
contractual relationship to a covenantal one.89
86. Id.
87. See SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 16.
88. See JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER'S CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL
PRACTICE 100-04 (1996) (describing the different approaches to client counseling employed by
lawyers adopting an ethic of care versus an ethic of rights).
89. See id. at 38-50. Like sacrifice, the idea of covenant is a religious concept that has
acquired over the centuries an entire theology and doctrine too extensive to survey here.
Covenants do, however, evidence several key characteristics that make them ideal models for a
counseling relationship. Among other qualities, they are gratuitous, mutual, lasting,
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3. Chilling Client Misbehavior
The narrowest but perhaps most provocative goal of vicarious
sacrificial atonement is the reduction of the overall level of client
misbehavior during litigation. I assert that in addition to increasing the
social and professional esteem accorded to lawyers and restoring the vitality
of the client counseling relationship, the establishment of a norm of
vicarious sacrificial atonement would prevent not only future bad acts by
clients whose lawyers have previously atoned for them but also misdeeds
by clients whose lawyers have not yet performed such acts but are members
of a class of professionals known to do so.
This effect seems counterintuitive-how will removing the apparent
costs of a particular behavior while maintaining its apparent benefits result
in a reduction in the frequency of that behavior? I appreciate this economic
intuition, and admit at the outset that chilling client misbehavior is perhaps
the most aspirational goal in a Note full of the same. It relies wholly on the
moral power inherent in acts of self-sacrifice, and reckons that power
greater than the admittedly powerful self-interest of a client allowed to
behave in a costless but advantageous way. 90 Assuming the effect exists at
all, the degree of ethical leverage exerted by those who offer themselves for
others will vary with certain conditions, including the status of the offeror
to the offeree and to the world at large. Accordingly, chilling client
misbehavior is the ambitious but natural extension of the two goals
discussed above.
The ability of lawyers to influence the ethical decisions of their clients
is widely accepted even by those who disclaim any obligation (or even any
right) for the lawyer to exercise that influence. Underlying the traditional
argument against the mandatory disclosure of client perjury, for instance, is
the contention that although clients do not have a right to behave badly,
"lawyers functioning within the.., relationship can do more for sound
morals than government can." 91 I happen to agree with this debatable
communitarian, and creative. They are also efficient-successful covenants do not require the
monitoring, bonding, and other costs that hamper a standard agency relationship. There is usually
at the outset a most solemn marker of the parties-a seal of blood, an act of sacrificial
atonement-that binds the two sides together with such force that adherence to the mutual
agreements of the covenant is assumed going forward. See generally DANIEL J. ELAZAR,
COVENANT AND POLITY IN BIBLICAL ISRAEL: BIBLICAL FOUNDATIONS AND JEWISH
EXPRESSIONS (1995) (surveying the development of the doctrine of covenant in a religious and
political context).
90. There are probably published psychological studies that would support this calculus and
probably those that would rebut it, but here I would like to depart from the standard practice of
legal scholarship and appeal to the reader's own experience. If it supports my assertion, the point
will be made with greater force than any citation could give it; if it does not, no amount of
scholarship will change that fact.
91. See SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 40. The ability of lawyers to shape client decisions
applies in corporate law as well as in litigation. See, e.g., SHAFFER WITH SHAFFER, supra note 14,
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empirical ordering, but note also that regardless of the relative efficacy of
private and public regulation, the lax enforcement of standards for the
disclosure of client perjury has failed to prevent its prevalence, perhaps
the most common form of client misbehavior during litigation.92 The
attorney-client relationship seems not to be operating at its full and
considerable moral potential.
Vicarious sacrificial atonement has the ability to restore the moral
efficacy of the attorney-client relationship without changing any of the
prevailing ethical codes or official regulatory standards. Such acts are not
obligatory and impose no enforceable duty on the lawyer faced with a
misbehaving client. Instead, they rely on two important characteristics of
vicarious sacrificial atonement: the ex ante process of identification
between the lawyer and her client who is contemplating a bad act, and the
ex post establishment of cohesion between the client and his lawyer who
has just made atonement for him.
The "threat" 93 of vicarious sacrificial atonement can operate
prospectively to prevent client misbehavior. For this to happen, however,
the client must know of, trust in, and appreciate his lawyer's background
willingness to assume responsibility for her client's actions. The first
requirement-that a client know of his lawyer's willingness to atone for his
bad act-implicates the client counseling goal discussed earlier. Any act of
vicarious sacrificial atonement must take place within the context of a
healthy counseling relationship that both predates and survives the bad act.
Such a relationship increases the likelihood both that the client will disclose
to the lawyer his contemplation of the bad act and that the lawyer will have
the opportunity to counsel fully against it.
The second requirement of a credible "threat" of vicarious sacrificial
atonement is that the client trust in his lawyer's willingness to perform the
atoning act. This requirement implicates the earlier goal of increasing
respect and esteem for lawyers. The lawyer's threat is only viable if the
client accords both her and her profession the type of respect associated
with those who keep their promises and are serious about their moral
commitments. I have already discussed the challenges to increasing respect
for lawyers as a class; esteem for the individual lawyer will arise only from
the substance of her dealings with her clients, and thus the lawyer's stated
willingness to make atonement must follow and accord with behavior that
evidences the values of selflessness and compassion. 94 Of course, nothing
at 214 (discussing anecdotal evidence that "business people are subject to moral influence from
their lawyers").
92. See supra note 45.
93. Cf SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 95 (discussing the coercive power of the threat of
abandonment).
94. The requirement of client trust also implies that the key barrier to the goal of chilling
client behavior is the prospective systematic unwillingness to accept acts of vicarious sacrificial
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003]
The Yale Law Journal
proves willingness to perform like actual performance, and a successful act
of vicarious sacrificial atonement is the strongest evidence that the lawyer
will serve the values it promotes. Although performance of the act implies
that the client has misbehaved in a particular instance, its accomplishment
adheres the attorney to her client, strengthens the credibility of the
attorney's future threats, and increases the esteem due all lawyers to such a
degree as will have significant positive influence on the efficacy of their
counseling efforts and ultimately the moral quality of litigation experienced
by all participants. In this way, acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement strive
toward a more inclusive and complete understanding of justice.
The requirement that the client appreciate his lawyer's willingness to
make vicarious sacrificial atonement demands more than simply locating
and understanding her intention within the context of their prior and
anticipated future dealings. The client and the lawyer must also identify
with each other. This identification must include an understanding of each
other's role in the instant dilemma, the considerations of right and wrong
that inform the other's thinking, and the consequences to each other of the
possible outcomes. But the most important dimension along which the
lawyer must identify with her client is their mutual moral fallibility.
Adopting a position of moral superiority encourages the one who is by
insinuation morally inferior to compensate by shifting both his culpability
and his punishment to the oppressor. The lawyer must be wary of such
posturing, and affirm in the client their common membership in a
community that often faces, and fails, difficult moral and ethical tests.
This is a crucial point: The "moral power" inherent in self-sacrifice should
not-must not-derive from the guilty feelings of the one whose
punishment has been removed from him. That is, the costs of the client's
misbehavior must be shifted fully to the attorney, not transmuted from legal
or economic burdens to emotional or psychological ones.
A client may know of, trust in, and appreciate his lawyer's willingness
to make vicarious sacrificial atonement and yet still commit the bad act. He
may do so out of good motives or bad. The lawyer may want him to do so
or be utterly dismayed at its occurrence. In the end, there is certainly the
risk that clients will take advantage of vicarious sacrificial atonement. I
believe that the characteristics and values of such acts are compelling
enough to mitigate significantly that risk, but there is ultimately no
rejoinder to the opposing view-vulnerability to exploitation is a position
of weakness from which acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement present
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themselves. I do not think that such vulnerability lessens the importance of
the acts or the larger norm; it might even increase it.95
Finally, since I suspect that those who have worked with actual clients
are likely to be most skeptical of the viability of this last goal, I should
reemphasize that it is just that-a goal, not a prediction. This also seems
like an opportune time to begin a discussion of the various barriers to acts
of vicarious sacrificial atonement.
C. The Barriers to Vicarious Sacrificial Atonement
I suggest that there are three principal barriers to acts of vicarious
sacrificial atonement: the demands and expectations of the adversary
process, the prevailing professional ethic of independence, and a system-
wide unwillingness to acknowledge the sufficiency of sacrificial acts to
atone for the wrong committed. The first two of these are ethical; the third
is moral. Before tackling these arguments, however, let me briefly address
two more abstract critiques--one from liberalism, the other from
Liberalism.
The former insists first that no power should compel acts of vicarious
systematic atonement and second that, absent such compulsion, no lawyer
will ever attempt such acts. My response to the first assertion is enthusiastic
agreement. The values of vicarious sacrificial atonement are obliterated by
force, and such acts must be wholly, even if hesitantly, voluntary. The
second assertion may be true, although history, religion, and domestic life
suggest that the capacity for vicarious sacrificial atonement exists under
certain circumstances, some of which may even involve lawyers.
The Liberal critique brands such acts paternalism, the bogeyman of
relativists and law professors everywhere.96 But vicarious sacrificial
atonement is not "the imposing of constraints on an individual's liberty for
the purpose of promoting his or her own good., 97 Instead it is the imposing
of constraints on one's own liberty for the purpose of promoting the good
95. See infra Subsection III.C.4.
96. One scholar has memorably dubbed paternalism "the royal road to totalitarianism." Paul
Roberts, Philosophy, Feinberg, Codification, and Consent: A Progress Report on English
Experiences of Criminal Law Reform, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 173, 228 (2001). But the classic
warning comes, perhaps ironically, from Justice Brandeis: "Experience should teach us to be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty.... The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 1 have
already noted the paternalistic overtones in Justice Brandeis's teaching on legal ethics. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
97. David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454, 461(quoting Dennis Thompson, Paternalism, Medicine, and Public Policy, in ETHICS TEACHING IN
HIGHER EDUCATION (D. Callahan & S. Bok eds., 1980)).
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of the other. The paternalistic have nothing at stake; they act to better their
own lot, with no risk of loss. Vicarious sacrificial atonement requires that
one lose something of personal value in order that another might gain.
There is certainly more heft to these objections than I have disposed of
here,98 but more concrete and more significant barriers present themselves.
1. The Adversary Process
No less a titan of the adversary process than Chief Justice Warren
Burger once said:
The entire legal profession-lawyers, judges, law teachers-has
become so mesmerized with the stimulation of the courtroom
contest that we tend to forget that we ought to be healers-healers
of conflicts. Doctors, in spite of astronomical medical costs, still
retain a high degree of public confidence because they are
perceived as healers. Should lawyers not be healers? Healers, not
warriors? Healers, not procurers? Healers, not hired guns? 99
98. Indeed, there are certainly more than just two abstract critiques. Another might be from
economics, which suggests that, like any premium service, a market would arise around a
lawyer's willingness to make vicarious sacrificial atonement for her clients. This is a perverse
possibility, to be sure, but its likelihood is largely irrelevant to the conclusions of this Note. To see
why, assume arguendo the establishment of a (necessarily) informal market, with clients
contemplating perjury as buyers and lawyers willing to assume responsibility for their clients as
sellers. Transactions would occur at the margin between the benefit of the "sacrifice" to the clients
and the cost of the "punishment" to the lawyers, and fascinating legal scholarship would abound.
But each compensated "sacrifice" would be nothing more than a quoted euphemism for a free-
market sale through which the central elements of the sacrificial dynamic had been monetized,
negotiated, and exchanged. From this perspective, the argument from economics collapses into the
argument from liberalism, since one way to compel someone is to pay her.
The existence of such a market, however, would undermine the norm of vicarious sacrificial
atonement in at least one significant way: by establishing a presumption, difficult to rebut, that
every lawyer who purports to make a sacrifice for her client makes a "sacrifice" instead. Any
increase in the moral stature of lawyers would suffer accordingly, and those committed to the
upkeep of that stature would be forced to expend the resources necessary to sustain it.
A final, related concern: Again assume arguendo (and this takes some doing) that the
practice of vicarious sacrificial atonement in fact takes hold and individual lawyers begin to make
such acts on behalf of their clients. The system permits them to do so and imposes on them the
harsh but appropriate penalties otherwise attributable to their misbehaving clients. Despite having
willingly accepted those penalties, the lawyers, having paid them, are naturally disinclined to do
so again. A new class of lawyers thus has been formed: those who will screen prospective clients
for ones who will not commit the sort of infractions for which the lawyer may atone. Accordingly,
such clients-who deserve representation as good as that received by those who do not share their
unfortunate tendencies-will not have full access to the legal resources they deserve. There is no
adequate response to this concern other than to say that if it is ever borne out, the norm of
vicarious sacrificial atonement already will have advanced very far and our profession will look
very different indeed.
99. Warren Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62, 66, quoted in
ALLEGREMrl, supra note 88, at 69.
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I have already discussed at some length the role of the adversary process in
undermining public confidence in and respect for lawyers,' 00 and further
below I address some traits of the American justice system that render it
hostile to acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement.' 0' I wish here only to make
the limited point that such acts are not inconsistent with advocacy or a
vigorous adversarial process. William Stringfellow, a theologian and
litigator, wrote that to be an advocate is to "undertake the cause of another
(including causes deemed 'hopeless'), to intercede for the need of another
(without evaluating it, but just because the need is apparent), to become
vulnerable (even unto death) in the place of another."'10 2 He might as well
have been describing vicarious sacrificial atonement. As I hope I have
demonstrated, vicarious sacrificial atonement enacts an extreme loyalty to
clients, a cohesion that transcends the lawyer's own priorities and self-
interest. Although embedded in our particular adversarial system are aspects
of societal morality that may forestall acts of vicarious sacrificial
atonement, there is nothing inherent in the adversarial process to discourage
or preempt lawyers from making such sacrifices on behalf of their clients.
2. The Ethic of Independence
The developed codes of legal ethics erect a higher barrier to acts of
vicarious sacrificial atonement than does the adversary process. The ABA's
Model Code and Model Rules instantiate an ethic of moral independence
and provide safeguards to ensure its protection. Through them the lawyer is
insulated from both the immoral actions of her client and the common
morality of the surrounding community. At the extreme, her connections to
both parties are dangerously attenuated, and she can look only to herself
and her colleagues to justify her ethical decisions. This arrangement-the
product of selfishness and fear-discourages acts of vicarious sacrificial
atonement.
Thomas Shaffer contends that the majority of the Model Code is
focused on protecting the lawyer from corruption by the client, not directing
the lawyer how best to serve the client's interests:
[T]he law on lawyers is now concerned with whether lawyers are
obliged to refuse to do the wrong actions clients want them to do.
The law on lawyers has been purged of concern for the goodness of
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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101. See infra Subsection III.C.3.
102. William Stringfellow, A Lawyer's Work, 3 CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC'Y Q. 17, 19 (1982),
quoted in ALLEGRETTI, supra note 88, at 76.
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clients. It treats clients as threats, threats to the rights-that is, the
isolation and independence-of lawyers.'03
Professor Shaffer argues that prevailing legal ethics seeks first to protect the
rights of lawyers and only then to promote the good of clients.' 4 Because
distance is the best defense, the Model Code and Model Rules carve out for
the lawyer a position of moral independence according to what Murray
Schwartz calls the "Principle of Nonaccountability": "When acting as an
advocate for a client... a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor
morally accountable for the means used or the ends achieved."' 05
The irony here is that the efforts of the ethical regime to protect the
lawyer's independence cause her to lose her own subjectivity. She becomes
an object acted upon by the client and the codes rather than a vital principal
able to engage the client and to apply effectively the ethical leverage to
which her training and status aspire. I do not deny that there are substantial
professional benefits to the moral independence of lawyers, including the
unfettered ability of the attorney to advocate his client's cause without fear
of complicity. Such benefits, however, must be balanced against the
dangers of moral independence. The first is what Professor Shaffer calls the
"comfort of irresponsibility,"'' 0 6 which leads to a dulling of the faculties
required to dispense moral advice both to the client and to oneself. The
second danger of moral independence is related: The lack of a strong
external moral referent results in the promotion of an "ethic of honor and
shame [that] says that the way to be good is to seek the approval of
professional peers."'' 0 7 The establishment of this ethic completes the
enclosure of the lawyer in a self-contained and insular moral world.
Particularly given the danger that personal identity and professional roles
will merge,' 0 8 such moral isolation not only weakens the attorney-client
relationship but also risks personal insecurity and unhappiness.
Here vicarious sacrificial atonement has something to say to the lawyer
and the codes. Unlike prevailing norms, vicarious sacrificial atonement
does not seek to segment morality or to isolate legal ethics from other
influences. Instead, it looks to diverse traditions for ethical guidance and
imports values from outside the bounds of the profession. It regards both
103. SHAFFER WITH SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 15; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH
AND THE PROFESSIONS 275-76 (1987). Recall the Model Rules' fear of lawyer complicity in client
perjury: "[T]he client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to fraud on the court."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (2002).
104. See SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 13-20.
105. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 669, 673 (1978), quoted in LUBAN, supra note 73, at 7.
106. SHAFFER, supra note 13, at 20.
107. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Thinking Theologically About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA.
L. REv. 467, 469 (1990).
108. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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attorney and client as moral actors, and encourages in the former an ethic of
care motivated by selflessness, compassion, and identification. In its
concern for justice and truthfulness, it regards the good of the community
over the rights of the lawyer, and allows the lawyer through her sacrifice to
participate in the achievement of that common good.109 She is a subject, not
an object, a principal, not an agent, and in the act of vicarious sacrificial
atonement both she and her client are reconciled to all.
3. The System Itself
At the outset of this Note, I asserted that our legal system is readily
familiar with the concept of atonement.' 10 In every circumstance, however,
atonement is sought from the perpetrator of the wrong, a perfectly
reasonable arrangement but not the one I have presented here. In fact, we
are loath to rupture the connection between debtor and repayment, criminal
and punishment, and our refusal to do so stands as the greatest barrier to
acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement. This refusal is essentially a moral
stance, not an ethical one, and as such, the best approach seems to be to
describe its contours briefly and let the reader compare what she knows of
its virtues to the moral goods putatively achieved by vicarious sacrificial
atonement.
There are three systemic entities whose prevailing views on the moral
issues involved here-foremost among them the purpose and value of
punishment-are essentially hostile toward vicarious sacrificial atonement:
the courts, the public, and the injured. The views of the courts are the most
consequential but also the most contingent, as a shift in public opinion can
lead to the passage of new laws and regulations that judges and magistrates
may be obliged to follow."' In any case, the judge occupies the privileged
position of independence: He is the caretaker of the justice system, and
should act in its best interests. Recalling the client perjury hypothetical
109. Stephen Garvey's theory of atonement in criminal punishment relies directly on the
interposition of "the community" into God's place in the traditional religious understanding of
atonement. See Garvey, supra note 10, at 1810. 1 agree that this is a valid-albeit weaker-secular
analogue.
110. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
111. Judges customarily have fairly broad discretion to manage the administration of their
courtrooms. See, e.g., State v. McCahill, 811 A.2d 667, 678 (Conn. 2002) (striking down a statute
prohibiting judges from granting bail to certain classes of criminal defendants on the grounds that
the regulation "significantly interferes with the orderly functioning of the [court's] judicial role").
Accordingly, it should not surprise us to see some variety of responses to a proposed act of
vicarious sacrificial atonement. It is likely that most would be hostile-judges as a class prize
procedural regularity, and such an act as contemplated in the client perjury hypothetical above is
nothing if not irregular. Irregularity is, I think, the first systemic barrier to vicarious sacrificial
atonement, and it is likely to cause the greatest consternation in the judges who must adjust their
expectations accordingly. This is not precisely a moral issue, but might in the end be the most
significant determinant of judicial receptivity to acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement.
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discussed earlier, I hope I have made a persuasive case that the benefits to
that system morally justify acceptance of the lawyer's act of vicarious
sacrifice.
The views of the public are theoretically irrelevant to the viability of
acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement, but ultimately important to the
establishment of the broader norm. In the current climate, it seems unlikely
that popular sentiment would welcome what would likely be perceived as
the excusal of a defendant without sufficient penalty. Although nowhere in
my advocacy of vicarious sacrificial atonement do I suggest that lawyers
assume the criminal penalties attributable to their clients-only those
penalties that arise during the adjudication of their crimes-the opprobrium
given to criminal defendants for the wrong of which they have been
accused is likely to follow them through its prosecution as well.' 12 This
likelihood aside, the public at large arguably has little right to enforce the
maintenance of the connection between an individual obligator and the
satisfaction of his obligation, and has no recourse if other parties allow that
connection to be broken by an act of vicarious sacrificial atonement. If this
right inheres at all, it does so most securely in the entity that has suffered
the injury resulting from the client's misbehavior.
I am acutely aware that throughout this Note I have focused on the
attorney-client relationship and not on this injured third party, who may
well be unwilling to accept the lawyer's act of vicarious sacrificial
atonement. In some cases, the primary victim will be the presiding judge or
court; in others, it may be a truthful but discredited witness or an
adversarial civil litigant. In nearly all cases there will be a multitude of
injured parties, some personal and some corporate, many harmed in nearly
imperceptible ways, but all with both rights and goods that an act of
vicarious sacrificial atonement would seek to honor and to serve. It is
important to emphasize that such acts do not deny the wrongfulness of the
client's infraction or the need for atonement. They are attempts not to
sidestep the law or the punishment it requires, but rather to satisfy it fully. If
the full satisfaction required by the law is then rendered, the injured party
has no remaining basis for its claim except a sense of unfulfilled personal or
corporate vengeance. 13 I do not completely discount such bases (for
112. See Smith & Montross, supra note 36, at 444 (noting that, when it comes to criminal
defense, "[b]lame is a favorite pastime" and that "there is a universal call for individual
accountability").
113. To see why, return briefly to the client perjury hypothetical and its injured party-the
nearsighted witness whose testimony was discredited. Under the prevailing legal regime,
disclosure of the defendant's lie following his acquittal might lead to his prosecution for perjury.
In the best scenario for the discredited witness, that prosecution is successful and the defendant
pays the just penalty for his lie. I assert that in such cases the witness has no remaining legal or
moral claim against the perjurer. Those who agree with this conclusion are those who accept a
system ofjustice in which penalties are measured and assessed with regard to the transgressor's
actions and not his victim's sympathies. In such a system, the payment of a penalty by a
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example, in all cases a show of contrition from the misbehaving client is to
be preferred over aloofness or denial), but suggest that the value of serving
them will in most cases be significantly outweighed by the moral and
ethical benefits of the act of vicarious sacrificial atonement.
There is, finally, a systemic barrier that is neither moral nor ethical and
yet presents a serious challenge not only to the outcome of the earlier client
perjury hypothetical but also to the norm of vicarious sacrificial atonement
from which the outcome derives.' 4 The "truth-seeking" approach employed
to reach that outcome assumed a priori that the attorney was certain of both
the proximate and the ultimate truths of the scenario. Leaving aside for the
moment questions of epistemology, it is clear that in making such an
assumption the lawyer usurps the traditional-and proper-role of the
factfinder. The coup declares the lawyer's disdain for the competence of the
institutions designed to weigh and determine the truth and threatens to
destabilize the system built around those same institutions.
This critique meets with both a theoretical and a practical response. The
former refers back to my earlier discussion of attorneys as "officers of the
court" and, as such, "officers of the truth."' 5 The very word "officer"
suggests that the lawyer's role is to serve the truth and to act as its agent. It
also implies the sort of discretionary authority with regard to the truth that
our system has in fact granted to attorneys, who are called on constantly to
assess, frame, and present their clients' claims. In this way lawyers are
themselves the earliest and most prolific of all factfinders. Although their
findings are not legal "fact" until reached by a judge or jury, that
provisional status in no way prevails upon the relation of those findings
to reality.
But theoretical justification for this lawyerly role fails unless the
lawyers themselves are not only generally competent to discharge it but
also confident in their assessment of a given client's particular claims-that
is, of reality. This underscores an important practical constraint on acts of
vicarious sacrificial atonement, namely, that their propriety is highly
contingent on the circumstances surrounding the decision to perform them.
I have mentioned already that such acts lose their vitality when they are
compelled; they likewise lose their validity when they are contrived. Many
different factual scenarios and client relationships may accommodate acts
transgressor is sufficient to discharge his debt; for better or worse, once the verdict is reached, the
victim is no longer legally relevant. Without making any value claims for that arrangement, I note
only its logical corollary-the imposition of an equivalent penalty on a legitimate substitute
satisfies all claims to the same extent as it would were it imposed on the transgressor himself.
114. Although the following discussion implicates the broader norm of vicarious sacrificial
atonement, it is tailored to the client perjury context. Questions of "truth" are not as pressing in
the event of procedural infractions such as refusals to make discovery or failures to appear.
115. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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of vicarious sacrificial atonement, but in no case should such acts be
performed without careful consideration of their purpose and effect.
4. Failure
Acts of vicarious sacrificial atonement may fail, for all of the reasons
described above and many more.' 16 In fact, absent substantial change in the
attitudes and practices that motivate the prevailing justice system, both
individual acts and the establishment of a broader norm are certain to fail.
But even certain failure should not preclude effort. There is a value beyond
efficacy, and there is virtue in defeat.
Judge James Edwin Horton, Jr. understood this.1 17 He understood that
granting a new trial to Haywood Patterson, one of the famed "Scottsboro
Boys" tried for capital rape in Alabama in 1933, would end his career as an
elected judge. He said as much to those who asked. He understood also that
his action would have no effect on the ultimate disposition of Mr.
Patterson's case-Patterson would be retried by a different judge and found
guilty. There were legal reasons not to grant the defendant's motion, but
there were more powerful moral reasons to grant it, and so he did.
What Judge Horton did was an act of vicarious sacrificial atonement.
Not for Haywood Patterson, who had done nothing to require it, but for a
corrupt and racist system of justice which-like a client-had enriched the
judge and to which-like a client-he had sworn allegiance. His act of
atonement evidenced selflessness, compassion, and an identification with
the wrongful system. It expressed justice, truthfulness, and a mercy that is
best expressed through care.
Judge Horton was no saint; he was instead, as Thomas Shaffer
says, "like any person of his time and place, walk[ing] fearfully in a
dark night."'1" The Jewish religious philosopher Martin Buber invokes a
similar image:
[T]he way, the real way, from the Creation to the Kingdom is trod
not on the surface of success, but in the deep of failure. The real
work, from the biblical point of view, is the late-recorded, the
116. See Garvey, supra note 10, at 1846-58 (discussing the many ways atonement can fail in
the criminal justice context).
117. The definitive account of Judge Horton and the Scottsboro case is DAN T. CARTER,
ScoTrSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979). For a thorough ethical
analysis of Horton's actions in the case, see SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 144-52.
118. SHAFFER, supra note 14, at 147.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 113: 219
Sacrifice, Atonement, and Legal Ethics
unrecorded, the anonymous work. The real work is done in the
shadow, in the quiver." 
9
In the end, each of Judge Horton's expectations came to pass: He was
defeated in the next election, and Haywood Patterson was found guilty in a
subsequent trial. The Alabama courts continued in their discrimination
against and mistreatment of African-American criminal defendants. But
there is value and virtue in the judge's act. Its worth lies not in its
immediate success, but in its persistence through the deep of failure.
CONCLUSION
The suggestions and implications of this Note are strange. They
contradict some of the most basic assumptions about our justice system and
subvert some of its highest goals. They may well be wrong, or dangerous,
and as such they are presented to individual readers to consider carefully
and decide for themselves.
But there is the decision, and then there is its application. I can agree, as
I have so often in this discussion, with Professor Shaffer when he says that
"[t]he aim of moral life with patients, students, or clients ... is to serve in
such a way that the person served will himself become a servant-that he
will himself be moved to love, to good works, to the company of those who
serve." 1 20 I can believe that vicarious sacrificial atonement is a powerful
means to accomplish that goal. But the qualities such acts require of
me-selflessness, compassion, and identification; justice, truthfulness, and
care-too often seem beyond my ability or even my inclination to achieve.
I am encouraged in this by the words of the medieval English mystic
Walter Hilton: "I feel ... so far in true feeling from that that I speak and
have spoken, that I can nought else but cry mercy, and desire after [it] as I
may." 12' Such aspiration is a familiar position for ethicists, but perhaps a
more demanding one than is usually adopted by lawyers facing ethical
issues. Compare Charles Fried's casual treatment of a classic nonlegal
dilemma, that "[o]ne who provides an expensive education for his own
children surely cannot be blamed because he does not use these resources to
alleviate famine or to save lives in some distant land,"'' 22 with the full
casuistical analysis of the same problem conducted by ethicist Garth Hallett
119. MARTIN BUBER, Biblical Leadership, in ISRAEL AND THE WORLD: ESSAYS IN A TIME
OF CRISIS 119, 133 (Syracuse Univ. Press 1997) (1948), quoted in SHAFFER, supra note
103, at 39.
120. SHAFFER, supra note 103, at 65.
121. WALTER HILTON, THE SCALE OF PERFECTION 34 (Evelyn Underhill ed., John M.
Watkins 1923) (1375).
122. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066 (1976).
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in his book Priorities and Christian Ethics. Professor Hallett concludes that
everyone should prioritize the starving or threatened over his own well-
being, but those who lack the ethical wherewithal to do so should not be
rebuked for their shortcoming. 123 The difference between the two
approaches is subtle but critical. For the lawyer, the allocation of blame too
often answers the question of how to act. The obligations of prevailing legal
ethics are defined in the negative-"What must I do to avoid censure?"'
' 24
For the moral ethicist, the question is more likely to be "What can I do to
work the greatest good?"
I have cast Professor Fried as a straw man, to be sure. His comment is
a passing remark used to support a wholly different ethical argument.
Professor Hallet, on the other hand, reaches his conclusion only after
meticulous examination of the problem from first principles. But
perhaps we should apply such strict scrutiny to the practices of our
own profession as well. At the very least, we should approach the
challenges of legal ethics from a greater distance, striving toward
answers that satisfy our broadest moral aspirations for law and
lawyering. Such struggle is itself a sacrifice-of our comfort and
time, and perhaps dearer things besides. I hope I have shown it would not
be in vain.
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